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WeRe MuscoVY aND castiLe
tHe FiRst FiscaL-MiLitaRY states?
In this article Chester Dunning examines recent scholarship about John 
Brewer‘s model of the development of the early modern „fiscal-military“ state 
and the possibility of applying Brewer‘s model to sixteenth-century Russia and 
Castile (Spain). He concludes that Muscovy and Castile were probably the first 
“fiscal-military” states.
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В данной статье Честер Даннинг рассматривает недавние иссле-
дования, посвященные модели развития «фискально-военного» госу-
дарства Нового времени, созданной Джоном Брюэром, а также возмож-
ность приложения модели Брюэра к России XVI в. и Кастилии (Испания). 
Он делает вывод о том, что Московское государство и Кастилия, возмож-
но, были первыми «фискально-военными» государствами. 
Ключевые слов а: модель Джона Бревера; XVI век; королевство Ка-
стилия; Московия.
During the past twenty-five years, the concept of the “fiscal-military” 
state has taken firm root in historiography as an alternative to “absolutism.” 
Many scholars have jettisoned the fuzzy and shopworn term “absolutism” 
in search of a more useful framework for comparative study of the develop-
ment of early modern European states – the acceleration of expenditures, 
coercive taxation, and the build-up of powerful bureaucracy, logistical 
infrastructure, and military forces in light of the gunpowder revolution. 
The term “fiscal-military” state was coined by John Brewer in The Sinews 
of Power (1989) and applied to England’s emergence as a Great Power at the 
end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th century [Brewer, p. xvii]. Never-
theless, Brewer’s model is not exclusively Anglo-centric. In 1992 Nicholas 
Henshall suggested that Brewer’s concept of the fiscal-military state was 
a viable alternative to the meaningless term “absolutism.” He pointed out 
that by the late twentieth century “absolutism” was being defined in a way 
180 degrees opposite from its original meaning. Scholars using the term 
have moved away from an image of powerful monarchs ruling by coercion 
to one of deep cooperation between court and elites, between center and 
periphery [Henshall, p. 2–3]. In 2001 Jan Glete fleshed out the components 
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of early modern fiscal-military states and compared their successes and 
failures [Glete]. Among historians of early modern Europe the term fiscal-
military state quickly caught on, indeed caught fire – due primarily to the 
weakness of “absolutism” as an explanatory framework. Many articles and 
essays have examined the development of early modern Spain, England, 
Brandenburg-Prussia, France, the Dutch Republic, Portugal, and even 
countries outside of Europe within the framework of the fiscal-military 
state [Brewer, Hellmuth; Simms, p. 79–100; Monad, p. 245, 322; Swann, 
p. 151–153; Edling, p. 48; Tengenu].
The concept of the fiscal-military state promises to be a useful tool 
for the comparative study of early modern European state formation, 
the military (gunpowder) revolution and its impact, and the origins 
of modern state structures. It also promises to help explain the birth and 
growth of “leviathan-states” in early modern Europe far better than the 
outdated term “absolutism” has done. A comprehensive definition of fiscal-
military state is still in the process of formation, but it must of course begin 
with its relationship to the military revolution. The desire for conquest 
and expansion (or simply the need for stronger territorial defenses) had 
a profound effect throughout Europe. In most cases, the response of 
governments to the astronomically expensive military revolution and 
increasingly lethal geopolitical rivalries was to create stronger central 
administrative structures designed specifically to impose and collect higher 
taxes and to administer larger and increasingly professional military forces. 
As a result, state power grew enormously during the early modern period 
even as many European economies suffered from predatory taxes and 
increasing government interference. Fiscal-military states developed larger 
and more sophisticated centralized bureaucracies that were independent 
of traditional elites and were staffed by newly emerging professional 
bureaucrats and military personnel. Thus, the fiscal-military state was 
closely associated with innovation as well as increasing specialization 
and professionalization. Nevertheless, in mobilizing national resources 
and creating centralized power structures, kings and their ministers did 
not, as long thought, simply overawe and subjugate old elites, regional 
administrators, and local governments. Instead, fiscal-military states were 
characterized by cooperation between central and local governments 
and by an alliance between rulers and co-opted aristocrats who, far from 
resisting, were strongly attracted by the prospect of receiving prestigious 
and lucrative positions within the growing royal administration, its large 
military forces, or (in many cases) its expanding empire [Glete, p. 2, 7].
Although all fiscal-military states shared important basic characteristics, 
there were many variations due to such things as cultural differences, unique 
economic circumstances, pre-existing institutions and patterns of taxation, 
and relative levels of bureaucratic efficiency and comfort with innovation. 
Especially significant in determining the precise shape of each fiscal-military 
state was timing [Ertman, p. 1–34, 317–324]. All of them interfered with 
their domestic economies; but the ebb and flow of international pressures, 
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relative access to new technologies, and different stages of economic 
development (and availability of credit) help explain many of the variations 
among fiscal-military states and their infrastructures. Some fiscal-military 
states developed very rapidly while others were comparatively slow to adopt 
the coercive techniques necessary for greatly increased revenue extraction 
and the creation of new institutions and military forces needed to meet the 
challenges of the military revolution. 
The formation of the earliest fiscal-military states essentially predates 
capitalism, and those states tended to adopt extremely coercive methods for 
pulling revenue from their domestic economies without any real concern 
about the impact of their actions. Not surprisingly, such predatory practices 
often provoked fiscal crises and slowed down the development of capitalism 
[Henshall, p. 1–5]. Fiscal-military states that formed later tended to fare 
better, learning important lessons from the mistakes of the pioneers. Later 
fiscal-military states were often capable of mobilizing national resources 
without causing serious damage to the overall economy. Strategic planning 
and the use of well-trained professional bureaucrats yielded more reliable 
revenue streams and reduced destructive short-term expedients. More 
competent and effective administration also paid off on the battlefield and 
at sea [Glete, p. 142].
Spain – or, more precisely, the kingdom of Castile – has been plausibly 
identified as the first fiscal-military state [Rogers; Monad; Glete]. Long before 
the military revolution, Castile was already a highly militarized crusader 
state located on the frontier of Christendom and locked in a struggle to 
“reconquer” territory previously lost to Islam. That medieval experience 
greatly increased the power of the Castilian state and its rulers. By the 
beginning of the early modem period, the king of Castile was the absolute 
master of his realm where he wielded enormous power over his subjects, 
the economy, and even the church that neighboring monarchs could not 
imagine for themselves. Organized for ambitious military expansion in 
the name of God and king, Castile’s bureaucratic administration and fiscal 
system contributed greatly to the enhancement of state power [Laredo 
Quesada, p. 177–196; Gelabert, p. 201–238]. War and the maintenance 
of military forces typically accounted for about half of Castile’s annual 
expenditures [Rogers, p. 6; Thompson, p. 274–283, 290–291]. To pay those 
bills the Castilian bureaucracy used extremely coercive means of resource 
extraction that seriously harmed the country’s economy, slowed down the 
growth of capitalism, and periodically contributed to fiscal crises that led 
to even more destructive short-term revenue producing expedients. Castile 
was chronically short of funds and often desperate to find the huge sums 
necessary to carry out its ambitious imperial agenda. Nevertheless, its 
early successes and the rapid growth of the Spanish empire worked against 
needed reform and promoted arrogance and bureaucratic inertia that ended 
up helping to ossify the economy, the state, and the empire [Glete, p. 100].
Castile’s military expansion was not primarily motivated by profit. 
It was instead a sacred mission of the state carried out by aristocratic 
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warriors. The level of cooperation between the Castilian government and 
national, regional, and local elites was very high, and taxes were imposed 
and collected without any meaningful consultation with the taxpayers. The 
king of Castile could also count on the strong support of the church as his 
empire expanded, and his powers over the church within his domain were 
very great. Such pronounced secular dominance was due in part to the king’s 
decision not to staff his bureaucracy with church-trained administrators 
and the fact that the language of his court and bureaucracy (Castilian) 
was different from the language of the church (Latin) [Ruiz, p. 29–34, 
147–148, 154]. Castile provides us with a very interesting case study of an 
early fiscal-military state. Were there any other similar pioneering fiscal-
military states? The answer is a resounding yes! In many ways Muscovy 
was remarkably similar to Castile, something previously noted by several 
scholars [Billington, p. 69–71; Yanov, p. 7; Downing, p. 64].
I was the first historian to apply the term fiscal-military state to early 
modern Russia [Dunning, 1998, p. 119–131; idem, 1999, p. 136–137]. 
In my book, Russia’s First Civil War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding 
of the Romanov Dynasty (2001), I described Russia in the sixteenth century 
as a somewhat primitive but highly effective version of the fiscal-military 
state [Dunning, 2001, p. 11, 19–21, 27–29, 34, 45–46, 48, 73, 462– 463, 
476]. Influenced by Jan Glete, in 2004 James Cracraft published The Petrine 
Revolution in Russian Culture in which he used the term fiscal-military state 
to refer to the powerful military and bureaucratic system built up by Peter 
the Great – a more rational and efficient system of central command and 
control, taxation, recruitment, training, and supply [Cracraft]. In 2006 I co-
authored an article with Stephen Smith titled “Moving beyond Absolutism: 
Was Early Modern Russia a Fiscal-Military State?” The article explores 
the bankruptcy of the terms “absolutism” and “autocracy” as explanatory 
frameworks for the study of early modern Europe and Russia, and it argues 
in favor of regarding Muscovy as one of the earliest fiscal-military states 
[Dunning, Smith, p. 19–43].
Several other scholars, including Brian Davies, Sergei Bogatyrev, and 
David Goldfrank, have made use of the concept of the fiscal-military state in 
writing about Muscovy. In 2007 Christoph Witzenrath published Cossacks 
and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725, in which he made sophisticated use of 
the term fiscal-military state in discussing Russia in the seventeenth century 
[Witzenrath]. In 2009 the Hungarian scholar Endre Sashalmi published 
a thoughtful essay titled “Russia as a Fiscal-Military and Composite-
Dynastic State, 1654–1725.” Sashalmi acknowledged that the fiscal-military 
state is a highly plausible model for the study of early modern Russia, but 
he rejected Dunning’s idea that Muscovy became a fiscal-military state in 
the 16th century. For Sashalmi, the key to the emergence of a fiscal-military 
state was the creation of large and permanent armed forces, an increase 
in the number of administrative personnel, and increased taxes and 
government activity in order to finance those expenses. Sashalmi criticized 
Cracraft for focusing only on Peter the Great and the early 18th century. 
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Instead, he pointed to the Thirteen Years’ War (1654–1667) as the real point 
of origin of Russia’s fiscal-military state, referring to the build-up of the 
Russian bureaucracy and military forces during the long, exhausting war 
with Poland-Lithuania. Sashalmi also emphasized the relationship between 
the growth of the concept of the state in the second half of the seventeenth 
century and the actual growth of Russia’s state apparatus and its increasing 
bureaucratization [Sashalmi, 2009b; 2009a, p. 131–147].
In 2009 Christopher Storrs published a collection of essays about 
fiscal-military states in the eighteenth century. Janet Hartley contributed 
an interesting essay, “Russia as a Fiscal-Military State, 1689–1825.” 
Hartley emphasizes the fact that Russia was almost constantly at war in 
the eighteenth century and was essentially a garrison state and a fiscal-
military state. Nevertheless, she is somewhat hesitant about using the term 
fiscal-military state to describe eighteenth-century Russia because much 
of Russian society remained unmilitarized and Russia’s fiscal and banking 
structures (as well as its industrialization) lagged far behind the West. In 
other words, Hartley regards Russia not so much as a strong fiscal-military 
state as somehow managing to muddle through as a Great Power and huge 
empire [Hartley, p. 125–146]. In my opinion, Hartley does not focus enough 
attention on serfdom as the fuel for Russia’s successful fiscal-military state, 
and she appears to misunderstand the relationship between increased local 
autonomy and the emergence of a powerful fiscal-military state (which is 
based on cooperation and devolution of authority) [Bogatyrev, p. 59–127]. 
For the past twenty-five years Brian Davies has been demonstrating the 
importance of the period leading up to Peter’s reign in the development 
of Russia’s military forces and administrative competence [Davies, 1992, 
p. 481–501; Idem, 2004]. Davies is also a leading expert on warfare in early 
modern Eastern Europe. In his recent book, Warfare in Eastern Europe, 
1500–1800, Davies refers to the model of the fiscal-military state as a 
“prevailing paradigm” and calls for a more precise definition of the term 
[Davies, 2012; 2011].
In my view, Muscovy qualifies as a fiscal-military state by the sixteenth 
century. There is no need to wait until the eighteenth century. Marshall 
Poe has convincingly demonstrated that it was the sixteenth century that 
saw the development of key bureaucratic institutions, taxation, and war-
making ability in Muscovy [Poe, 1996, p. 608–618; 1998, p. 247–273]. 
At a conference I attended on “War and Warfare in Northern Europe, 1550–
1721,” held in early 2013 at the University of Aberdeen, historians of early 
modern Russia, Poland-Lithuania, Germany, Sweden, Scotland, England, 
and France welcomed the model of the fiscal-military state as a useful 
tool for the comparative study of early modern Europe. In The Northern 
Wars: War, State, and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721 (2000), 
the sponsor of the Aberdeen symposium, Robert I. Frost, drew attention to 
Russia’s increasing momentum in the late sixteenth century. He correctly 
regarded Russia’s Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century as a powerful brake suddenly applied to that momentum [Frost]. 
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The Time of Troubles definitely interrupted the formation of Russia’s 
fiscal-military state. Far from slowing down its development, however, 
the Troubles actually accelerated the growth of state power, bureaucracy, 
and coercion that produced the rapid expansion of the Russian empire in 
the seventeenth century and its emergence as a Great Power by the early 
eighteenth century [Dunning, 2001, p. 443–480]. 
The model of the fiscal-military state promises to help us better 
understand some important aspects of early modern Russian history. It 
cannot explain why Castile managed to produce Don Quixote and Muscovy 
did not, but it can help explain why the promising economic development of 
both countries collapsed during the reigns of Philip II and Ivan the Terrible.
_________________
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